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ID Number policies in Europe
Der Beitrag liefert einen Überblick über die konzeptionellen, historischen, soziologischen und 
technischen Implikationen einer Politik der Identifizierungsnummern zwischen funktionalen 
Verwendungsinteressen einerseits und dem Datenschutz andererseits. Der Beitrag prognos-
tiziert unterschiedliche Identifikatoren für verschiedene Verwendungszwecke, die interopera-
bel sein können, aber auch gleichzeitig eine Steuerung durch den Nutzer ermöglichen.
Abstract
The objective of this article is to present a 
view on the sensible use of the identifica-
tion numbers, especially in the public do-
main. The question of whether proper use 
can be achieved by a single global identi-
fier or multiple identifiers will be answe-
red.
In the report on which this article is 
based, several FIDIS partners investigated 
different aspects of ID numbers, such as 
the history of the use of identification doc-
uments, the legal framework, the sociolog-
ical theoretical aspects and the possible 
use of ID numbers in the technique of pro-
filing. Thus the investigations presented in 
the report provided a sound basis for de-
termining the risks and opportunities in 
using ID numbers, especially in the area of 
e-government. 
From a European point of view the 
choices made of using either a single glob-
al identifier or multiple identities, are il-
lustrated. The report shows how the ID 
number can be put to good use while at the 
same time not unduly harming the priva-
cy interests of the individual.
1 Introduction
Within the Fidis (Future of Identity in the 
Information Society) network of excel-
lence a study has been made of identifica-
tion number policies across Europe.1 The 
study is part of the analysis of the implica-
tions of technologies for protecting and 
enabling the secure and trusted distribu-
tion of identity digital assets.
Much discussion takes place about the 
desirability of a single identification num-
ber in the context of eGovernment devel-
opment. This is a matter of a fundamental 
nature. It goes without saying that person-
al identification forms an important part 
of the foundation of our society. It allows 
us to create a link between people, actions 
and responsibilities. In many ways it is one 
of the lubricants which allow society to 
function.2 
Whereas in the past, physical means of 
identification predominated, we are now 
on the eve of an era where digital equiva-
lents of these forms of identification will 
take over.3 Without these measures, fight-
ing crime will be obstructed, ambitions in 
the field of eGovernment will be frustrat-
1 Buitelaar, H. (ed.), D13.3: Study on ID number 
policies, FIDIS deliverable, 2007. Gratitude is due to 
the main contributors to the study: Marita Häuser, 
Martin Meints, Martin Rost, Unabhängiges Landes-
zentrum für Datenschutz (ICPP), Kiel, Mireille Hilde-
brand, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, Xavier Huysmans, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven (ICRI), Isabelle Oomen, Universi-
teit van Tilburg (TILT)..
2  Prins, C. and de Vries, M., ID or not to be? Naar 
een doordacht stelsel voor digitale identificatie [ID 
or not to be? Towards a well thought out system for 
digital identification], Rathenau Instituut, Working 
document 91, den Haag, 2003, p. 13.
3  College bescherming persoonsgegevens, Elec-
tronische overheid en privacy. Bescherming van 
persoonsgegevens in de informatiestructuur van de 
overheid, Den Haag, 2002.
ed, companies and citizens will lack faith 
in e-commerce, to name but a few things 
that could go wrong. 
Careful attention to the design of the 
system of digital identification is essential. 
It may be fair to state that it is doubtful 
whether there is sufficient consideration of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the 
use of an identification number, without 
which, a digital identification system can-
not function.4 
Being part of the broader Fidis network 
of excellence it is therefore worthwhile to 
analyse several crucial aspects of the poli-
cies which might lead to enabling secure 
and trusted distribution of identity digital 
assets. A historical analysis is provided in 
an attempt to make clear the background 
against which political choices in several 
European countries are made concerning 
the framework within which ID numbers 
are distributed. It goes without saying that 
the legal aspects of the use of digital iden-
tification need close scrutiny. 
After all ID numbers are personal data 
and therefore the European Data Directive 
might be expected to offer a firm basis for 
a proper use of the ID number. Even 
though it might seem that ID numbers are 
a mere technical matter for which a prop-
er legal basis is present, it turns out that 
this legal basis is soon set aside for techni-
cal priorities and managerial advantages. 
In order to understand why the general 
public quite often – as was shown in the 
historical chapter has felt an almost in-
stinctive need to oppose the general intro-
duction of such a number, a sociologial 
4  Koops thinks the time is ripe for a reconsidera-
tion because once the information society is there it 
cannot be turned back. Koops, B.J., ‘Een nieuwe 
GBA, digitale kluisjes en identificatiedrang’, [A new 
GBA, digital vaults and the identification urge], NJB, 
vol. 32 (32), 2001, pp. 1555-1561.
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analysis pinpoints some of the reasons for 
these sometimes irrational emotions. The 
article concludes with a technical chapter, 
which offers some hope, that exactly the 
boundless surge of claims that technology 
makes to create this ideal world of eGov-
ernment, will help in putting the digital 
identity number to good use with due re-
spect for the privacy of the citizens con-
cerned. 
It can be stated that means of identifica-
tion increasingly pervades the public sec-
tor. They originated in distinct areas of the 
public sector. Examples are taxation, pub-
lic health, law-enforcement, local admin-
istrations and social services. 
In the light of attempts to streamline 
government operations by making sys-
tems interoperable and in fighting fraud 
and terrorism, different developments can 
be witnessed in various EU countries. The 
various solutions proposed, offer different 
benefits and pose different threats to both 
governments and citizens. 
The most eye-catching solution in this 
respect is the introduction of a single per-
sonal identification number to be used 
throughout the public sector. Undoubted-
ly, the advantage in reducing the adminis-
trative burden for both government and 
citizen makes the single identification a 
very attractive proposition. At the same 
time, the costs of security measures to 
safeguard it, may not be sufficient to retain 
the citizen’s trust in a reliable govern-
ment. 
In the scenario, where substantial user 
control is absent, the introduction of a 
unique identifier makes the consumer and 
citizen more transparent. Facilitating the 
linkage of a profile to the number ID and 
linking different profiles to each other via 
this number, could potentially result in 
undesirable surveillance opportunities. 
2 Historical approach
To be able to identify individuals in a reli-
able way always has been of importance, 
especially in the context of social groups 
(e.g. clans) and later in the context of 
States. This need typically covered all 
phases of human life, from birth to death. 
The context for identification always has 
been the determination of membership or 
non-membership in a group, a clan or 
State, and the regulation of access to re-
sources, ownership or participation in this 
context. 
In early societies such as the Greek Po-
lis, identification was done by inspection. 
Societies were not very large, so every cit-
izen knew every other citizen of his Polis 
in person. 
This situation changed dramatically al-
ready in the Roman Empire. From time to 
time Roman Emperors tried to count their 
citizens using a census, as reported for ex-
ample in the Bible (e.g. by the evangelist 
Luke in chapter 2.1). The census informa-
tion was important to calculate taxes, the 
number of slaves and the number of pos-
sible soldiers. A census did not provide a 
means for identification of individual cit-
izens.5
Somewhat later another practice be-
came common: the use of travel docu-
ments for individuals. Typically these doc-
uments were used for persons with a spe-
cial status such as rich citizens and noble-
men. These travel documents typically 
were documents for passing through an 
area: visa or letters of recommendation. 
The purpose of these documents was to re-
duce the risks of travelling. 
This was accomplished by a certificate 
of a reference person (typically a person of 
high status that was widely known) that 
the travelling person travelled for legiti-
mate reasons, was trustworthy and worth 
being protected and supported on the 
journey by local authorities.
Taking in criminals on the other hand, 
was supported by using warrants of appre-
hension. They included a detailed descrip-
tion of the person searched for, the so 
called “signalement”, and were copied 
many times after printing of books was 
developed.6
After the reformation the Catholic 
Church needed to know – among other 
things for tax reasons – how many mem-
bers belonged to it. To facilitate this, the 
Council of Trent decided in 1563 that 
priests should write lists of persons who 
were baptised and married, and later also 
of those who were confirmed and buried. 
From the perspective of the Catholic 
Church this information was most impor-
tant as it showed the real identity of a 
member of the church. Through baptism 
people became members of the church, a 
Christian marriage was important for a 
5  By the time of the Emperor Augustus, 30BC to 
14AD, censuses were taken every 5 years. The Cen-
sor was an important public position in Rome. The 
census was also about taxation potential.
6  Groebner, V., Der Schein der Person, München, 
2004.
Christian life of couples and families, and 
a Christian burial also was very impor-
tant. 
This way of showing the identity of the 
church member, helped in guaranteeing 
that a person could be resurrected from 
death with a complete body, despite ill-
ness, wounding and death in his physical 
life.7
In 1796 Fichte stated that citizens need-
ed to be detectable for public authorities at 
any time. For this purpose he suggested 
the introduction of a passport for every 
citizen, which precisely describes the pass-
port holder. 
Pursuing the same target, Jeremy Ben-
tham suggested in 1843 that every citizen 
should bear a unique name. This name 
should be noted in a citizens’ register and 
also should be tattooed on the wrist of the 
corresponding citizen. This permanent 
link between a physical person and a name 
certified by public authorities would 
strengthen the law and result in the disap-
pearance of many criminal activities, Ben-
tham claimed. In addition the identifica-
tion would support prosecution in case of 
criminal actions.8
The French Revolution led, among oth-
er things, to the introduction of the “Code 
Civil” as civil law on 20th of September 
1792. Because of the resulting modern un-
derstanding of citizenship, citizens’ regis-
ters were run by the State instead of the 
churches. Identification of citizens of the 
State was based on a paper-based ID doc-
ument together with an appropriate entry 
in the citizens’ register by public authori-
ties.9 
The reintroduction of ID documents 
that were terminated earlier in the French 
Revolution resulted in a dilemma that was 
quite typical for the 19th century. On the 
one hand increasing liberalisation re-
quired free movement without passports 
standing in the way. On the other hand in 
times of real or perceptible crises, inner se-
curity (today often called homeland secu-
rity) became a bigger issue and thus regis-
7  Brockhaus, Konversationslexikon, Leipzig, 
1898.
8  Caplan, J., ‘This or that Particular Person’, in: 
Caplan, J and Torpey, Documenting individual iden-
tity, Princeton, 2001; Cf de Hert, P., ‘Jeremy Bentham 
on the need for identification by governments’, in 
Koops, B.J., Buitelaar, H. and Lips, M. (eds), D5.4, Ano-
nymity in electronic government: a case-study ana-
lysis of governments’ identity knowledge, FIDIS De-
liverable, 2007.
9  Groebner, V., Der Schein der Person, München, 
2004.
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tration of citizens and foreigners together 
with issuing ID documents was undertak-
en regularly. 
But the target of effective administrative 
control in practice was seldom achieved 
due to putting off implementation of iden-
tifying measures. Noblemen typically did 
not need any ID documents, while normal 
citizens needed them as soon as they were 
leaving the county where they were living. 
Foreign travellers in addition had to keep 
strictly to a prescribed route and faced in 
addition numerous controls on their way. 
De facto migration started to be a seri-
ous issue already in the 19th century. Mil-
lions of people moved around without any 
passport, changing effectively the demo-
graphic, political and economic landscape 
of Europe.
But ID documents also became impor-
tant in another context in the 19th century. 
Police forces throughout Europe had in-
troduced registers of poor people and of 
people that were moving around such as 
beggars, crippled people, veterans from 
various wars, prostitutes, lepers and show-
men. 
Security of the local population was a 
motivating factor for this registration, but 
different treatment of the local bereaved 
persons compared to moving poor people 
also was an issue. Based on the right of 
people at home the local poor population 
got better support (e.g., food and housing) 
compared to other groups. In any case to 
receive grants, people had to identify 
themselves using ID documents.10
When States in Europe changed from 
absolute monarchies to constitutional 
States in the 19th century, the relationship 
between State and its citizens changed. 
Passports (pass from the French term 
passer: going from one place to another, 
port from porter: to carry) turned to be 
more than an ID document, they also con-
firmed that the holder was member of the 
issuing State and thus accepted as citizen 
and protected by it. Especially the issuing 
State allowed the travelling, including re-
turn and reintegration in the State of ori-
gin after return. 
Though the 19th century also is called 
the passport-less century – most States in 
middle and western Europe cancelled the 
obligation to carry a passport in the last 
third of this century –, a number of differ-
10  Probably for this reason many VIPs think that 
a request for identification comes close to an of-
fence (Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts, 1997).
ent regulations on ID documents and cit-
izens’ registration remained.11
In the past century ID cards came to be 
introduced. In the First World War 
(1914-1918) in Germany an ID card was in-
troduced, as in times of war, control of 
people moving around and their identifi-
cation seemed to be very important. Orig-
inally it was planned to have fingerprints 
in this ID card, but this was not imple-
mented as dactyloscopy (comparison of 
fingerprints) typically was used as a foren-
sic method at that time, replacing the an-
thropometria (registration and compari-
son of physical properties of persons). 
At that time the German State decided 
to use photos in ID cards in order not to 
convey the impression that the ID card 
holder might be a criminal.12 In the 1930s 
in Germany a national ID card (so called 
Kennkarte) was established. 
Currently national ID documents and 
passports are changing their character, as 
smart chips, RFID chip, magnetic stripes 
or laser engraved zones (a so-called laser 
band) are increasingly introduced. They 
are used to store information about the 
holder of the ID document digitally. In 
fact digital storage, transfer and process-
ing of identifying information become in-
creasingly important. 
One example of this is credit cards 
which also can be used for payment pur-
poses via the internet. In the USA where 
currently no national ID card exists, the 
credit card also is used for identification 
purposes, e.g., in hotels or when booking 
a flight. In fact in Anglo-American coun-
tries national ID documents never were 
really established except in times of war.
3 Legal aspects
Taking the needs of eGovernment as a 
starting point, the legal contribution to the 
study discusses the roles so-called entities 
can have in a particular sector. Entities can 
be attributed a global, sector-specific or 
context specific identifier. In e-govern-
ment an attempt is made to optimise ser-
vice delivery by channelling internal and 
external relationships through technolo-
gy. 
11  Gosewinkel, D., Einbürgern und Ausschlies-
sen, Göttingen, 2001.
12  Donatsch, A., Identifizierung von Tatverdäch-
tigen in: Unipublic., Veröff. Der Universität Zürich, 
2000.
Interoperability and the usage of com-
mon ID numbers for all relevant entities 
then make the usage of ID numbers tanta-
mount for e-government. Bearing this in 
mind the question is whether they are sup-
ported by a sound legal framework, wheth-
er the usage of global identifiers is enough 
to guarantee the rights of the individual as 
defined in the European Data Protection 
Directive13 or should technical unlinkabil-
ity also be a requirement of e-government 
architecture? 
The contribution makes clear that ID 
numbers are personal data and therefore 
the processing of these numbers should be 
carried out subject to the Data Directive. 
This means that attention should be given 
to the legitimacy of the processing, the da-
ta quality and aspects of confidentiality 
and security. It may be said to be unfortu-
nate that the Directive leaves the stan-
dards for safeguards for ID-numbers, that 
Member states put in place, up to the 
Member states. 
With the present state of knowledge it 
might have been expected that due to the 
value the Directive puts on the sound pro-
tection of the ID number, that technical 
unlinkability would have been prescribed. 
After all, the Directive does point out that 
appropriate technical and organisational 
security measures must be taken. These 
should take account of the state of the art, 
the cost of their implementation and the 
risks represented by processing and the 
nature of the data. 
In the context of eGovernment the pro-
cessing of personal data should be respect-
ing the minimum data and data process-
ing quality principles, such as the ‘finali-
ty’ and the ‘proportionality’ principle (ar-
ticle 6 of the Directive). 
Briefly summarized, the term finality 
refers to the obligation to only collect per-
sonal data for specified, explicit and legit-
imate purposes. Personal data shall not be 
further processed in a way incompatible 
with those purposes. Further processing 
of data for historical, statistical or scientif-
ic purposes shall not be considered as in-
compatible if the appropriate safeguards 
are taken. The purpose of the processing 
should be defined the latest at the moment 
of the collection of the data.
13  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the process-
ing of personal data on the free movement of such 
data, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 
281, 23 November 1995, pp. 31 – 50.
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The proportionality principle has to be 
understood in terms of:
storage duration: The processed data  
may not be kept in a form permitting 
identification of data subjects for longer 
than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data were collected or for 
which they are further processed.
necessity of the data: The processed da- 
ta should be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they are collected and further 
processed.
further processing of the data: The pur- 
poses of further processing should not 
be incompatible with the purposes ini-
tially defined for which the data were 
collected. 
accuracy: personal data should be accu- 
rate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date.
Applied to ID numbers, it is clear that the 
data controller that decides to make use of 
a global, sector-specific or context-specif-
ic identifier should: 
make sure that the chosen data (for ex- 
ample, a global ID number instead of a 
sector-specific one) is adequate, relevant 
and not excessive in relation to the pur-
poses for which it is being collected and/
or further processed;
make sure that the ID number is accu- 
rate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date and
not kept in a form which permits iden- 
tification of data subjects longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the 
data were collected or for which they are 
further processed. 
In addition, on the topic of finality and 
proportionality, it is important to note 
that when two or more government enti-
ties integrate their back-offices, there will 
typically be a reuse of personal data for an-
other purpose than the one that was orig-
inally indicated. 
For example, when a particular set of 
data has been collected from a citizen for 
unemployment allowance purposes, the 
idea of eGovernment would be to make 
that data directly available to the tax au-
thorities – of course within the borders of 
the law – instead of asking it again to the 
citizen.
As mentioned, the finality principle re-
quires the further processing to be com-
pliant with the original purposes.14 
The main point of departure is that 
identifiers are definitely needed in the 
public sector, especially to achieve the 
goals of eGovernment, for instance, “the 
integration of back-offices”. Without data 
protection rules, it seems obvious to 
choose common, global identifiers be-
tween these back-offices, and not techni-
cally to be constrained by context- and or 
sector-specific identifiers. 
The question that is raised is whether 
the usage of global identifiers within a 
sound legal framework can be acceptable 
from a legal perspective for the default da-
ta exchange between two or more govern-
ment entities or not. The alternative would 
be to choose technical unlinkability as a 
requirement of an eGovernment architec-
14  For instance, this means that it is absolutely 
unacceptable for a bank to process client payment 
data for direct marketing purposes. This further pro-
cessing is here clearly incompatible with the original 
purposes.
ture, which would imply the usage of con-
text- and/or sector-specific identifiers.
At the other side of the spectrum, the 
study analyses the data protection rules. 
From this perspective, the conclusion was 
drawn that:
If the usage of global identifiers is for- 
bidden in the Member State (e.g., be-
cause it is unconstitutional), technical 
unlinkability should be a requirement 
of the architecture design.
The Data Protection Authority has the  
important task of verifying that context-
specific numbers are indeed not being 
used outside their respective contexts. 
If the usage of   some or all global identi-
fiers is regulated, the basic data protec-
tion rules still apply. The additional ru-
les should take the data protection prin-
ciples as a minimum. The Data Protec-
tion Authority here mainly verifies whe-
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ther the conditions under which that 
identifier may be processed are ful-
filled.
If the usage of global identifiers is allo- 
wed or at least is not forbidden, the Da-
ta Protection Authority only verifies 
whether the number is being processed 
within the limits of the data protection 
regulation (finality, proportionality, 
protection level etc.), as explained abo-
ve.15
Additional, crucial issues were noted, 
when having a closer look at the data pro-
tection principles. From this analysis it 
can be indicated that:
The data controller should make sure  
that the chosen data (for example, a glo-
bal ID number instead of a sector-spe-
cific one) is adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which it is being collected and/or further 
processed.   
In other words, a global identifier can be 
excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which the data is being collected. For in-
stance, if no legitimate cross-context or 
cross-sector data exchange is present at 
the first processing of the ID number, a 
context- or sector-specific identifier 
should suffice.
The data controller should make sure  
that the ID number is not kept in a form 
which permits identification of data 
subjects for longer than is necessary for 
the purposes for which the data were 
collected or for which they are further 
processed. 
In practice, this means that when the  
purposes of processing the ID number 
have been realised, it should be anony-
mized. Encrypting or encoding the ID 
number will most probably not be suf-
ficient if the reason why the ID number 
is being processed like that (encrypted 
…) is to be able to re-identify the person 
if needed. In that case, the ID number 
would still be identifiable data – and 
thus also personal data.
To evaluate the necessary, “appropriate”  
technical and organizational security 
measures, three factors play a role: (1) 
the state of the art, (2) the cost of their 
15  De Bot, D., Privacybescherming bij e-govern-
ment in België. Een kritische analyse van het Rijksre-
gister, de Kruispuntbank van Ondernemingen en de 
elektronische identiteitskaart, [Privacy protection in 
e-government in Belgium. A critical analysis of the 
Rijksregister, the Crossroads bank of enterprises and 
the electronic identity card] Vandenbroeke, Brugge, 
2005, p. 56.
implementation and (3) the risks repre-
sented by the processing and the nature 
of the data to be protected. 
The state of the art means that security 
measures should follow the technological 
evolution. This means that if technologies 
to ensure unlinkability between contexts 
and sectors mature sufficiently (which is 
more and more the case today) they should 
be chosen if they are more conducive to-
wards achieving the goals of the process-
ing. It also means that it can be an unac-
ceptable risk to not take unlinkability 
measures. 
Yet, this is also the tricky part of the an-
swer to the above mentioned question on 
“technical unlinkability”: it depends on 
the evaluation of the case at stake.
The technical section of the study shows 
that, unfortunately, the present legal 
framework soon becomes inadequate in 
preventing the technical linkability of po-
tentially privacy harmful data about citi-
zens on the basis of ID numbers. Once the 
necessary infrastructure is in place, in-
cluding global ID numbers, data exchange 
will take place anyway either legitimately 
or illegitimately, based on an ad hoc argu-
ment or on political choices. 
4 Sociological aspects
In spite of the many managerial advantag-
es, ID numbers arouse strong emotions 
which cannot be solely comprehended 
from a legalistic suspicion of being poten-
tially harmful to the individual’s privacy. 
Therefore the study introduces a sociolog-
ical analysis of the function of ID num-
bers. The sociological approach is looked 
at from two angles: social systems theory 
and a theory on the role of bureaucracy in 
national states. 
The social systems theory views society 
from a general perspective, allowing the 
analysis of the function of ID numbers in 
private and public organisations. By thor-
oughly analysing the function of names, 
identifiers and addresses it can be ascer-
tained that ID numbers fulfill all three 
functions of a name, an identifier or an ad-
dress. First, they can be used as names for 
a data set or a number of data sets in a da-
tabase. Secondly, they can be used as iden-
tifiers if they link a person uniquely in an 
administrative context. Thirdly, they can 
also be used as addresses. In the organisa-
tional context, social systems theory learns 
that addresses are always administered 
(generated, assigned and deleted or deac-
tivated) by organisations. Organisations 
also are also careful to resolve potential 
address collisions by keeping addresses 
unique in the particular scope of the oper-
ation. The state ensures addressability for 
governmental, private-sector or interac-
tional (citizen to citizen) operations. Ad-
dressability today covers persons, families, 
organisations and objects in the context of 
communication techniques. Addressabil-
ity is not possible without organisations. 
These organisations need the unique iden-
tifiability to run their operations smooth-
ly and efficiently. This in turn may lead to 
information asymmetry because, as shown 
in the legal analysis, it reduces the auton-
omy of individuals by the usage of link-
ability measures. In other words, a shift of 
power may occur in favour of the organi-
sation. In the context of states in many 
cases it is difficult to decide whether citi-
zens overall benefit from this development 
or not, the reason being that citizens typ-
ically take on two roles with respect to the 
state. On the one hand they are members 
and thus benefit from a strong state that is 
able to protect them and, on the other 
hand they are clients of the state who suf-
fer from reduced autonomy. 
The second sociological angle is based 
on the Weberian theory of bureaucracy. 
Against the background of the rationalisa-
tion processes going on in all areas of so-
ciety, the function of ID numbers is de-
scribed as having the purpose of provid-
ing the members of a state with a feeling of 
unity and cohesion within the perspective 
of increased globalisation. It can be said 
that in the past political rationalisation re-
sulted in the formalisation of the state. 
One of the unique properties of a state 
is a trained corps of civil servants special-
ly trained in and restricted to regulations. 
This corps of civil servants has as its main 
task, the identification of the members of 
the state to enable the state to carry out its 
primary tasks. According to Weber these 
bureaucracies are the ultimate example of 
the rationalisation process because they 
aim at efficiency, predictability, quantifi-
ability, control by substituting human 
judgement by non-human technology and 
irrationality by rationality. 
To carry out its tasks the bureaucratic 
government accordingly issued identity 
cards and codes. These identification 
means provided access to a whole series of 
files and data sets. ID numbers therefore 
became the symbols of this bureaucratic 
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culture. Seemingly meaningless numbers 
acquire meaning in this bureaucratic con-
text because the developing nation-states 
desired to attach meaning to this symbol. 
Sociologically speaking it is argued, this 
was an unfortunate choice because, as We-
ber already pointed out, this was the irra-
tionality of rationality. The intention of 
creating a notion of unity and solidarity 
was not attained because citizens felt, that 
the ID number identification led to deper-
sonalisation. It could be argued, that the 
mismanaged effort to create unity in states 
by the introduction of the ID-number, ac-
tually led to a sense of loss of privacy with-
out contributing to the sense of unity.
5 Technical aspects
Taking the risks and opportunities of ID-
numbers in the modern technological age, 
an investigation is made of the contrast be-
tween requirements that techniques such 
as profiling pose vis-à-vis the protection 
of the individual’s privacy privileges. Pro-
filing provides a new kind of knowledge 
used for decision-making based on Knowl-
edge Discovery in Databases (KDD). KDD 
requires per definition as much informa-
tion as possible about the individual, 
whereas traditional privacy rights focus on 
data minimisation. There is no easy solu-
tion for this conflict. 
One approach is to ask citizens to be 
more transparent by introducing sector-
wide and unique ID numbers, while at the 
same time attempts are made to make the 
state and its actions more transparent. Ex-
amples are, in the Netherlands, the intro-
duction of the National Trust Function to 
log the use of the national ID number and, 
the introduction of Freedom of Informa-
tion Acts in Germany, allowing citizens to 
access their own data files maintained by 
the state. 
Unfortunately, these attempts fall short 
in certain cases. In addition to limitations 
for citizens to access secret data, which is 
very understandable because these could 
be covered by trust based models, the use 
of profiling creates additional limitations 
for transparency. Certain types of profiles 
are not linked to the data they were de-
rived from, they are no longer personal da-
ta and, may be used to the disadvantage of 
the citizen in a non-transparent way. 
Due to the complexity of the underlying 
profiling processes, regulatory attempts to 
increase transparency fall short and, 
Transparency Enhancing Technologies 
(TETs) to fill this gap are limited in effec-
tiveness or do not even exist yet. Another 
problematic aspect of transparency is that 
from a social perspective people think, 
communicate and act in communication-
al terms. Data freely used in one context 
cannot necessarily be used in another. 
Keeping data in its appropriate context 
is also called the concept of contextual in-
tegrity. Informational self-determination 
can be understood as an important at-
tempt to put contextual integrity in legal 
norms, though certainly from a social per-
spective an inappropriate one in certain 
cases. These aspects are further elaborat-
ed in the FIDIS deliverable D7.9.16 
Yet another approach is the introduc-
tion of additional functions and tools that 
make the individual less recognisable or 
opaque. In this context different methods 
have been developed and implemented to 
restrict and control linkability facilitated 
by ID numbers. On the whole the techni-
cal study arrives at the conclusion that by 
introducing the concepts of contextual in-
tegrity and reciprocal transparency in 
combination with multiple identifiers, it 
looks like that both the needs of KDD 
techniques as well as the concept of priva-
cy can be achieved. This does need a fine-
tuned combination of transparency and 
opacity tools to be built into the new tech-
nogical infrastructure.17
6 European approaches
The report gives an empirical study of the 
background and present policy and usage 
of ID numbers in a sample of various EU 
countries. An attempt is made to provide 
an overview that shows how the attitudes 
towards and the choices made with respect 
to the usage of ID numbers can be very 
different in the EU region. 
For this reason country reports have 
been included on Belgium, France, The 
Netherlands, Czech Republic, Slovak Re-
public, Hungary, Germany, Switzerland 
and Austria. 
16  Hildebrandt, M. and Koops, B.J. (eds.), D7.9: A 
vision of ambient law, FIDIS Deliverable, 2007.
17  Gutwirth, S. and De Hert, P., ‘Privacy and Data 
Protection in a Democratic Constitutional State. Pro-
filing: Implications for Democracy and Rule of Law’, 
in Hildebrandt, M., Gutwirth, S. and De Hert P. (eds.), 
D7.4: Implications of profiling practice on democra-
cy, FIDIS Deliverable, 2005.
These country reports illustrate how the 
conceptual aspects that are analysed ear-
lier are put into practice. These empirical 
and conceptual approaches make it possi-
ble to elicit lessons learned and provide 
benchmarks, by which to develop argu-
ments for policy recommendations.
Taking into account national political 
strategies and existing infrastructures 
four different basic concepts on how to 
deal with ID numbers can be determined 
from the country reports. They are:
Introduction of sector spanning ID 1. 
numbers with a large area of use inside 
and outside the public sector mainly 
based on mutual transparency of use 
(example: The Netherlands)
Introduction of sector spanning ID 2. 
numbers with regulations on how they 
may be used (examples: Switzerland, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia)
Introduction of sector specific ID num-3. 
bers and organisational enforcement of 
borders of sectors (examples: Hungary, 
France, Germany)
Introduction of sector specific ID num-4. 
bers and organisational as well as tech-
nical enforcement of borders of sectors 
(example: Austria)
7 Conclusions
The analysis of ID-numbers and policies 
as provided in this Fidis study shows that 
ID-numbers are an essential tool for the 
realisation of eGovernment and modern 
business processes. Due to the increasing 
pervasiveness of Internet as a means of 
communication by governments and en-
terprises, there is a growing necessity for a 
secure identity management. 
The need to identify who communicates 
with whom is essential in an Internet en-
vironment because the Internet, by design, 
lacks these provisions. Because of these 
shortcomings various solutions have been 
developed. 
The identity number is a prominent 
one. As is shown, the developments in this 
area could affect the privacy interests of 
individuals. Individuals often need to dis-
close more personal data than strictly re-
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quired.18 Several steps are still being taken 
to tackle this problem.19 
The sociological and the historical anal-
yses indicate that only a carefully attuned 
policy will allow the present possibilities 
and opportunities of ID-numbers to be 
used successfully. From the socio-cultur-
al point of view, experiences in using the 
identification tool as a method by which to 
create a feeling of unity in a nation-state, 
that only exists in the minds of the heads 
of state, have led to the opposite result. 
From the social systems point of view, 
there are potential benefits as well as draw-
backs in the usage of an ID-number. In the 
public domain one of the drawbacks could 
be caused by the fact that citizens are 
members of a state as well as clients. The 
state benefits from the advantages of using 
ID-numbers and therefore these benefits 
also are beneficial to its members. 
Drawbacks might arise when these mea-
sures harm the clients of organisations 
when ID-number linkability is used to 
create information asymmetry in favour 
of organisations. Organisations may use 
this asymmetry to reduce the autonomy of 
the individuals. This, in turn, may result 
in a shift in the balance of power favour-
ing organisations.20 
The potential information asymmetry, 
as achieved by technical means, is illus-
trated by describing profiling techniques. 
Even though there are the large risks of 
abuse in these scenarios, the suggestions 
18  Cf Koops, B.J., Buitelaar, H. and Lips, M. (eds), 
D5.4: Anonymity in electronic government: a case-
study analysis of governments’ identity knowledge, 
FIDIS Deliverable, 2007.
19  Cf among other things the work done by the 
PRIME consortium as set out in the PRIME white pa-
per v2, 27 June 2007.
20  Bygrave, L.A., Data Protection Law, Approa-
ching its rationale, logic and limits, Kluwer Law In-
ternational, The Hague, London, New York, 2002, pp. 
94-95 writes “Public concern over such schemes 
centred primarily on their potential to significantly 
roll back the privacy and autonomy of citizens and 
undermine in turn the foundations for democratic, 
pluralistic society.” This is even more harmful.
for making good use of the opportunities 
technology has to offer are promising. 
This privacy-friendly scenario can be 
achieved through a joint effort of comput-
er engineers, legal experts and policymak-
ers. Within the scope of the European Da-
ta Directive the opportunities for using 
profiling techniques can thus be put to 
good use. Individuals can then be moni-
tored without necessitating any kind of 
transcontextual identification. This fits in 
with the purpose of the limitation princi-
ple of the Directive. 
Without a doubt, the protection of per-
sonal data is a fundamental right in the 
European Union. In many Member States 
it is a constitutional right.21 However, if ap-
propriate attention is given to the rights of 
individuals such as is expressed in the le-
gitimacy of the processing, the data qual-
ity and aspects of confidentiality and se-
curity and the principle of the protection 
of personal data or so-called information-
al privacy, this will enable a sound identi-
ty management. In the area of profiling 
this seems to call for limiting the use of 
personal data to the proper context. How-
ever, this could preclude the use of profil-
ing to its full potential.
It may be instrumental to redefine the 
concept of privacy in terms of “privacy as 
contextual integrity”22 while, at the same 
time, underpinning it with the appropri-
ate technical means. In this light it seems 
preferable and feasible to adopt multiple 
ID-number policies. 
21  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union enshrines the protection of personal 
data in Article 8 as an autonomous right, separate 
and different from the right to private life referred to 
in Article 7 thereof and the same is the case at natio-
nal level in some states. Cf Opinion 4/2007 of 20th 
June 2007 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party on the concept of personal data, available at 
http://ec.europe.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/wor-
kinggroup/index_en.htm, p.7.
22  A concept introduced by H. Nissenbaum in 
Nissenbaum, H., ‘Privacy as Contextual Integrity’, 
Washington Law Review 79, 2004, pp. 101-140. 
These allow to discriminate between 
different contexts providing tailored ID-
number policies, depending on which type 
of privacy is appropriate per context. The 
point of departure is a type of identity 
management based on user control. At the 
same time, the reciprocity or distribution 
of the transparency can be tailored, de-
pending on the need for checks and bal-
ances per context. 
This does not necessarily rule out in-
teroperability between contexts, because 
ID-numbers may be linked, e.g. via clear-
ing houses, to provide interoperability. 
The information asymmetry that looms 
behind the horizon may thus lead to the 
sought for sensible use of the ID number 
with due respect for the privacy of the cit-
izens concerned. 
In essence it may be concluded that mul-
tiple identifiers in conjunction with in-
teroperability and contextual integrity are 
the most promising solution for a sound 
identity management policy in the near 
future. This requires a fine-tuned combi-
nation of transparency and opacity tools 
to be built into the technological infra-
structure. 
In such a way the individual will not be-
come unnecessarily transparent nor will 
interoperability be precluded by excessive 
user control. The advantages of eGovern-
ment can thus be achieved reciprocally for 
government and citizen alike. Measures to 
prevent identity fraud must be part of this 
IDM policy while, at the same time, the 
corresponding security measures must be 
construed in such a way as to inspire the 
citizen with sufficient trust that the gov-
ernment treats his data safely. 
It may not be an unrealistic assumption 
that, if this avenue of using technology in 
this constructive way is followed, the con-
cerns, that arose from the analysis of the 
several constitutive elements of ID num-
ber policy choices, can be sufficiently 
addressed.
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